213. Clinton’s Success in the South.—Sir Henry Clinton, even without a very large force, found it possible to carry out his designs in the South with energy and success. Leaving Knyphausen a part of his force to defend New York, he started, December 26, 1779, with eight thousand men, for the South. Savannah fell into his hands, and a little later he invested Charleston. General Lincoln made the great mistake of allowing himself with five thousand men to be shut up in that city with no means of escape, and accordingly he was forced to surrender on the 12th of May, 1780, with his whole army. This was the severest blow the Americans had received. Clinton at once put Lord Cornwallis in command, after issuing a proclamation, threatening to deal with all who did not return to allegiance as traitors and rebels. He then went back to New York. South Carolina was soon overrun by the troops of Cornwallis, Tarleton, and Ferguson.

214. Northward Movement of the British.—The American standards, however, were kept flying by the heroic deeds of the partisan generals, Marion and Sumter. The British advanced northward, hoping to find very little opposition before reaching Virginia. Washington recommended the appointment of Greene to the command of the Southern army; but the intriguers were successful, and Congress recalled Gates from his retirement, in the hope that the experience of Burgoyne would be repeated by Cornwallis.^[98] But in North Carolina there had been no Schuyler to plan the campaign in advance, and there was no Arnold or Morgan to assist in carrying it out. Gates revealed his inefficiency at every step; and when the two armies finally came together, on the 16th of August, 1780, his troops suffered at Camden the most disastrous defeat ever inflicted on an American army. Though the American force was superior to the British, it was routed, driven in utter confusion from the field, and dispersed. Gates himself, after committing a succession of gross blunders, crowned his ignominy by joining in the panic and finally leaving the army to its fate. In four days he reached Hillsborough, some two hundred miles away. Thus the worst fears of Washington were fully realized, and the whole South was practically in the grasp of the British. Clinton might well suppose the end to be near at hand.

THE TREASON OF BENEDICT ARNOLD.

215. Growth of Arnold’s Disaffection.—As if to complete a year of disasters, the country received a terrible shock in the treason of one of its foremost officers. Benedict Arnold, who had been one of the most skillful, as well as one of the most energetic of commanders, had been slighted in various ways. Washington had repeatedly recommended that he be advanced from brigadier to major general, but Congress promoted five officers of inferior rank over him. These facts not unnaturally soured his temper, so that he was inclined to find fault with everything. While he was in this mood Washington assigned him to the command in Philadelphia, after the withdrawal of Clinton, where he was noted for luxurious tastes and extravagant methods of life. Meanwhile he became engaged to Margaret Shippen, a beautiful daughter of one of the most prominent Tory families in Philadelphia. Before many months, his views had drifted completely over to those of the moderate Tory party. After the surrender of Burgoyne, the British government had offered the colonies all the constitutional guarantees they had asked for before the Declaration of Independence, and Arnold, as well as the Tories generally, believed that these terms should have been accepted.

216. Charges by Congress against Arnold.—Arnold was seriously contemplating the advisability of resigning his post, owing to the hostility of the Executive Council, when charges of peculation and misconduct were brought against him. Thereupon he promptly demanded an investigation. He was acquitted, not only by a committee of Congress, but afterward by a court-martial, of all the charges excepting two of very trifling importance. But he felt insulted and persecuted. His hatred of Congress became intense, and accordingly, in the course of the six months from January to July, 1780, he devised one of the most infamous schemes in history. He entered into correspondence with the British commander, for the purpose of betraying the American cause. His letters, signed “Gustavus,” were answered by the British adjutant general, Major John AndrÉ, over the signature “John Anderson.” But nothing definite came of the matter until Arnold determined to ask Washington for the command of West Point, in order that this most important stronghold in the whole country might be turned over to the enemy for a good price. His request was granted, and his nefarious plans came alarmingly near to success.

217. Meeting of Arnold and AndrÉ.—In September the agreement had advanced so far that a personal interview between the officers in correspondence was thought desirable. The British fleet, temporarily under the command of Admiral Rodney, who had recently come from the West Indies, showed signs of great activity. It was the intention at an opportune moment to sail up the Hudson and make a show of attacking the fort. Arnold was to surrender it, with only a faint appearance of resistance. The American traitor was to sell his country for fifty thousand dollars and a commission in the British army. On the 18th of September, Washington left the fort for a conference with Rochambeau at Hartford; and this absence afforded the coveted opportunity. AndrÉ, ascending the Hudson in the British ship Vulture to a point near the fort, went ashore and passed the night with Arnold a few miles below the fortress. After some delays the agreement was completed, but in returning AndrÉ was obliged to cross and go down the river along the eastern shore.

218. Arrest of AndrÉ.—At Tarrytown, in a strip of neutral territory between the two armies, he was arrested by three young men headed by John Paulding. One of the party had on a Hessian uniform, and when they confronted AndrÉ, who was clad in citizen’s dress, he accosted them as friends, supposing they were British. They immediately declared themselves to be Americans, however, and roughly ordered him to dismount. Proceeding to search him, they found the fatal articles of agreement in his boots. As, however, they were unsigned, Colonel Jameson, to whom the documents and the prisoner were delivered, decided to forward the papers to Washington, and to send a message concerning the affair to Arnold.

219. Escape of Arnold.—Washington returned to West Point, September 25, and received the papers soon after his arrival. The letter had reached Arnold only in time to enable him to escape by taking a boat and rowing swiftly down to the British ship which was awaiting AndrÉ. When Washington read the documents he burst into tears, and with choking voice disclosed the affair to Lafayette and Knox and the other officers about him.

220. AndrÉ’s Execution.—AndrÉ was put upon trial by a court-martial consisting of fourteen officers, including Greene, Steuben, and Lafayette, and was pronounced guilty. Though every effort was made by Clinton to save his life, Washington was inflexible, and, on the morning of October 2, he died upon the gallows the death of a spy. Though the English have been inclined to dispute the justice of Washington’s action, the latest and most judicious of British historians of this period, Mr. Lecky, after a full examination of the facts, reaches the conclusion that his condemnation was justified by the usages of war. Benedict Arnold’s treason has properly given his name an immortality of infamy.

CAUSES OF DISCOURAGEMENT.

221. Discontent in the Army.—The treason of Arnold was followed by events in the army which added to the general distress and anxiety. The best of the troops were those that had enlisted during the hopeful period just after Burgoyne’s surrender, in 1777. The term of enlistment was “three years, or during the war.” The troops claimed that, as the three years would expire at the end of December, they would then be free. The officers interpreted the law as meaning that in case the war should continue more than three years, the soldiers would be bound to service until its close. The army had many causes of complaint. Paper money issued by Congress had now become nearly worthless. With this money Congress was reluctant to pay the troops, but there was no other. At the end of December many of the regiments had received no pay for sixteen months, and supplies of clothing and shoes were so small that when January approached, many soldiers were barefooted and in rags. The winter of 1780–1781 saw scarcely less suffering than did the winter at Valley Forge.

222. Spirit of Mutiny.—On New Year’s Day, 1781, thirteen hundred Pennsylvania troops claimed that their time had expired, and, seizing six field-pieces, set out for Philadelphia to secure their rights from Congress. After much parleying, Congress, through its president, promised to give them certificates of indebtedness and their formal discharge. Thus it was settled that the men who had enlisted on the ambiguous terms might go when the three years had expired. By this decision Washington’s army not only lost its best troops, but was agitated by the mutinous spirit of others who were tempted to try the same method. On the 20th of January a part of the New Jersey troops mutinied without any adequate reason, and were not subdued until they were met by a brigade of troops from Massachusetts. The insurgents were soon brought to order, and two of the ringleaders were shot by Washington’s command. Thus came to a close the most discouraging year of the whole war.

223. Discouragements at the Beginning of 1781.—The disasters that had come to the Americans in 1780 gave the British many reasons to hope for a successful end of the contest in the summer of 1781. After the defeat of Gates at Camden there was a reasonable prospect that Cornwallis, having completely established British authority in the farther South, would be able to overrun Virginia and then unite with Clinton in overwhelming Washington. This feeling received encouragement from the discontented state of the American army, but in their predictions the British greatly underrated the ingenuity and the resources of the American commander in chief. Congress, which had chosen to disregard Washington’s former recommendation by sending Gates to the South, was now, late in 1780, when there was only a forlorn hope of success, quite willing that the commander should designate the general to meet Cornwallis. Washington selected Greene, the man he had recommended the year before. The latter did not reach Charlotte in North Carolina until the 2d of December; but he found that much had already been done by Marion, Sumter, and Morgan to counteract the effects of disaster and to keep alive the patriotic spirit.

AMERICAN SUCCESSES IN THE SOUTH.

224. Victory at King’s Mountain.—Soon after the defeat of Gates at Camden, in the summer of 1780, Cornwallis had begun a northward movement. He sent on in advance two divisions: one under Ferguson, with about fourteen hundred men, and one under Tarleton,^[99] with about the same number. Ferguson soon found that patriots had arisen on every side. Enterprising hunters and backwoodsmen had come from all parts of the North and West, as well as from the neighboring regions, until nearly three thousand were in the path of his progress. Thwarted at every step, he was finally obliged to look for a way of retreat. His messengers to Cornwallis and his scouts were everywhere shot down as fast as they were sent out. His force was finally brought to bay on the top of King’s Mountain, where after desperate fighting it was compelled to surrender, October 7. As a result of this battle, in which Ferguson was killed and nearly four hundred men were lost, Cornwallis was obliged to fall back to Winnsborough.

225. Victory at Cowpens.—Against the force of Tarleton, Greene sent General Daniel Morgan,^[100] who had already shown great ability at Quebec, at Trenton, and at Saratoga. The forces of Tarleton and Morgan were about equal. The American commander chose, as a spot for the battle, an open plain where cattle had been herded, called the “Cowpens.” The British, though wearied after a difficult march of five hours, decided to advance at once to a front attack. The first volleys of the Americans caused the enemy’s line to stagger and fall back. As the British came on a second time to the charge, Colonel Washington, a relative of the commander in chief, who led the cavalry, swept around the American left and struck the British in the flank. At this moment the Continentals rushed forward in a bayonet charge with irresistible force. The British were obliged to give way at every point, losing two hundred and thirty killed and wounded and about six hundred prisoners. Tarleton escaped with difficulty. The Americans lost only twelve killed and sixty-one wounded. The battle of the Cowpens, fought January 17, 1781, was the most brilliant American victory of the war, as Camden had been the most disastrous defeat.

226. Morgan’s Race with Cornwallis.—Morgan, having now destroyed Tarleton’s force, at once set out to rejoin Greene, but, in order to do so, he had to run a race with Cornwallis for the fords of the Catawba River. Though the British commander had the shorter course, Morgan pushed on with so much greater speed that he was the first to cross and thus was able to rejoin the main army.

227. Battle of Guilford Court House.—Greene now determined, before fighting a decisive battle, to draw his enemies as far as possible away from their supplies. Sending on a part of his force in advance and placing himself in command of the rear, he kept near enough to Cornwallis to lure him on without giving him an opportunity for a decisive battle. At length, on February 9, the American forces united at Guilford Court House, only about thirty miles south of the Virginia border, and here Greene, after a delay of about one month, during which he received reËnforcements, selected ground for a battle. Though the British had a smaller force, they were veterans, while the larger part of Greene’s army was composed of recent recruits. In the battle which occurred on the 15th of March, the British had the advantage, but they lost so heavily that Cornwallis did not dare to pursue the defeated army. In order to reËstablish his communications with supplies, he moved southeast for the port at Wilmington.

228. Greene’s Recovery of the South.—Greene followed him rapidly until they were near the coast. Then Greene struck into the South for the purpose of reËstablishing his authority throughout the Carolinas. His march was not resisted with any success. September 8, after a masterly campaign extending over six months, he fought and won the last battle of the series, at Eutaw Springs, about fifty miles from Charleston. Thus, within little more than a year after the disastrous defeat of Gates at Camden, the brilliant campaign of Greene drove Cornwallis into Wilmington and the remaining British forces in the South into Charleston, and had practically cleared the intervening country of the enemy.

THE CLOSE OF THE WAR.

229. Movement of Cornwallis from Wilmington.—Cornwallis, however, did not long remain on the coast. As soon as he had refreshed his army, he attempted, with the help of Arnold, to overrun Virginia. Reaching Petersburg on the 20th of May, he was able, within a short time, to take and pillage the more important towns of Virginia, including Petersburg, Richmond, Charlottesville, Portsmouth, and Williamsburg. To meet these raiders, Washington sent Lafayette with an army of Americans and French, amounting to about five thousand men. The French commander, though only twenty-three years of age, had learned from Washington the art of harassing the enemy without bringing on a general engagement. Cornwallis now had a little more than seven thousand men. After trying in vain to bring Lafayette to battle, and to get reËnforcements from Clinton, he followed Clinton’s instructions by withdrawing his force to Yorktown, in order to put himself in communication with the British fleet. This was the fatal move that resulted in the loss of the British cause.

230. Plans of Washington and Rochambeau.—Two days after the British reached Petersburg, Washington had an important conference with Rochambeau at Wethersfield, Connecticut. There, it was decided to send to the West Indies for Commodore de Grasse and such ships of the French fleet as could be spared from that region. The purpose was to combine the French and Americans, either to make a joint attack upon New York, or, by a sudden movement toward the South, to overwhelm Cornwallis. De Grasse was to choose and to report whether he would go to New York, or would stop at the Chesapeake.

231. Plan of the Yorktown Campaign.—In due time, Washington learned that De Grasse had chosen the Southern destination, and accordingly he began at once to maneuver his force so as to lead Clinton to suppose that the purpose was a general attack on New York. He ordered all preparations to be made in New Jersey as though he intended a siege, even sending misleading dispatches, which he planned to have the British capture. So skillfully was this done, that even when the army began to move from the Hudson, the British believed it was for the purpose of a general attack upon the city from New Jersey and Staten Island. The secret of the movement was confined to the French and American commanders. Washington evidently believed with Franklin, that three persons can keep a secret only when one of them is dead. On the 19th of August, leaving a strong guard along the front line, the French and American armies commenced their Southern march. So skillfully had all plans been arranged, that Clinton learned of the movement only after the Americans had reached Philadelphia, nearly a hundred miles away. He attempted a diversion by an attack upon Connecticut, but it was impossible to retard the march, or distract the attention of Washington. The British could not follow without abandoning New York to Heath, who had been left with four thousand men on the Hudson.

232. Movement of De Grasse.—De Grasse, with a larger fleet even than had been anticipated, reached the Chesapeake on the day when Washington reached Philadelphia. The French admiral at once landed three thousand troops and turned them over to Lafayette, whose army was thus increased to about eight thousand men. The French general, knowing that Washington was not far away, threw his lines boldly across the peninsula, September 7, thus shutting Cornwallis completely in. The British now saw the James on the one side, the York River on the other, with De Grasse in the rear, and Lafayette in front. Their condition was hopeless.

233. Surrender of Cornwallis.—Though a few British ships reached the scene from the north, they were too weak to cope with the fleet of De Grasse, and there was, therefore, no possible escape. To break through the American lines was impossible, as Cornwallis was now confronted by an army more than twice the size of his own. The siege and bombardment began at once. The cannonade was continued for some days with terrific energy, till the British ammunition began to fail. The outworks were carried by an assault in two divisions,—one of Americans and the other of Frenchmen. The Americans, led by Alexander Hamilton, were the first to cross the British ramparts. This was on the 14th of October. On the 17th, just four years after the surrender of Burgoyne, Cornwallis hoisted the white flag. As soon as the preliminaries could be settled, seven thousand two hundred and forty-seven soldiers became prisoners of war.

234. Influence of the Surrender on the British Government.—The surrender of Cornwallis was virtually the end of this long and memorable contest, for it put enthusiastic life into the Americans, while it overwhelmed the British government with confusion. Those English statesmen who had opposed the war from the first so strengthened their following that they were able to sweep the king’s friends out of power and bring in a government that sympathized with their views. The king himself, though driven almost to despair by this stupendous event, was the last to recognize its real significance; but at length even George III. saw that with a war on his hands against France, Spain, and Holland, his American project, so dear to his heart, must now be given up. A new ministry, with Lord Rockingham at its head, was brought in to negotiate terms of peace.

235. Difficulties in making Peace.—There were long delays and many difficulties in arranging terms. These were greatly complicated by the fact that America had France as an ally, and France had to be consulted in regard to all the conditions. Congress had no money with which to pay off the soldiers, and no power to raise money in the individual states. Discontent among the rank and file threatened to end in the most serious revolts. Nothing but the infallible tact and skill of Washington prevented mutiny. The commander in chief, however, was inflexible in his determination that the forces should be kept up until the treaty was finally adopted. That painful period of distress and waiting at length came to an end, but it was not until September 3, 1783, nearly two years after the surrender at Yorktown, that the treaty was signed at Paris. By that act Great Britain acknowledged the independence of the country from Canada to the Floridas, and from the Atlantic to the Mississippi. The conquest of the West was thus admitted, but the northern boundary was left rather vague, owing to defective knowledge of the region.

236. Treatment of Tories.—The Americans made the mistake of refusing to grant amnesty to the adherents of the defeated party, as should always be done in civil war. The patriots, or Whigs, as they were often called, continued to persecute the Tories. Many were put to death, and thousands were obliged to flee into Canada and Nova Scotia, where their descendants still remember with bitterness the treatment of their ancestors.

237. Causes of Success.—The success of the Revolutionary War was mainly due to five causes:—

1. The unfailing courage, wisdom, and ability of Washington. Even in the darkest hours his confidence in the final issue never faltered. By the wisdom and persuasiveness of the letters which he sent to governors, members of Congress, and prominent men in all parts of the country, he inspired others with something of his own confidence and multiplied the friends of independence. His extraordinary military skill in knowing when to fight and when not to fight, enabled him to take advantage of the mistakes of the enemy and to strike a blow whenever he could hurt the cause of the British or inspire his own army with new courage.

2. The alliance and support of the French. Until the Yorktown campaign the active assistance of the French in the field was very slight, but the moral support was most important. While it inspired the Americans with new courage, it had a corresponding effect in disheartening the British, who had to fight the French in other parts of the world. But for De Grasse, the Yorktown campaign would probably not have been attempted; for, if attempted, Cornwallis could easily have been supported and relieved by the British fleet.

3. The weakness of the British commanders in the field. Gage, Howe, Burgoyne, Clinton, and Cornwallis were all greatly inferior to Washington and Greene.

4. The British, toward the end of the conflict, had four very important wars on their hands, so that they found it impossible to send large reËnforcements to their armies in America.

5. The persistent spirit of the American patriots. Though often defeated, and sometimes much disheartened, they stubbornly refused to give up. Even in the dark days of 1780, when the South was overwhelmed and overrun, they never regarded the cause as lost. It was this spirit which made it possible for Washington to keep a force in the field large enough to prevent the complete success of the British.

Born, 1754; died, 1833. Came to America, 1776; in 1779, as lieutenant colonel, organized in South Carolina a troop known as the “British” or “Tarleton’s Legion”; waged with it very effective partisan warfare; served with great success at Camden; defeated by Morgan at the Cowpens, 1781; made a raid in Virginia, 1781; returned to England and served many years in Parliament; knighted (Sir Banastre Tarleton), 1818.