CHAPTER VI.

Previous

Our Geographical Knowledge of the Isthmus—The Value of Early Narratives and Histories—Projects for Uniting the two Oceans by Canals and Railroads—Criteria for Assisting the Judgment—Tunnels, Harbors, Locks, Dimensions of Canal—Tehuantepec—The Garay Grant—Moro’s Survey—Barnard’s Survey—Honduras—A Better Route Practicable—Nicaragua—Louis Napoleon’s Scheme—Col. Childs’ Report—Variations of Route—Advantages of this Line—Chiriqui—St. Clair Morton—No Information Extant—Costa Rica—Railroad Practicable—Great Altitude of Ridge—Panama—Information Abundant—Garella’s Route—Hughes’s Route—Advantages—Cost of Canal on this Route—Mexican Desagues—Panama and Aspinwall—Harbors Easily Improved—Panama Railroad Company—San Blas and Bayano River—F. W. Kelly—McDougal’s Survey—Fine Harbors—Tunnel Seven Miles Long—Darien—Between Caledonia Bay and the Gulf of San Miguel—Baron Humboldt—Vasco Nunez—Paterson’s Colony—Causes of Its Failure—Dr. Cullen and Savana River—Reports the Ridge 150 Feet—English Company—Concessions of the Granadian Government—Mr. Gisborne Sent to Darien—His Speculations—Delayed at Carthagena—Stopped by the Indians—Supposed Success—Misunderstanding with Dr. Cullen—Returns to England—Provisional Directory Organized—Controversy Between Sir Charles Fox and the London Times—Combined Expedition of Four Governments—Lieut. Strain’s Misfortunes—Fails to Find a Pass—Dr. Cullen and Mr. Gisborne’s Failure—Captain Prevost Fails to Cross—Dr. Cullen Changes His Opinion—French Expedition under Bourdiol—Fails to Cross—Granadian Expedition Fails—Condensed Statement of the Results of all the Expeditions—Captains Prevost and Parsons see Evidences of a Pass—Darien Not Yet Explored—San Miguel to the Gulf of UrabÁ—The Atrato Route—Successful Survey—Representations of Unprofessional Persons—Gorgoza and De La Charme—Their Route—Trautwine —Mr. Porter and Kennish’s Routes—Lieut. Michler’s Route —Extracts from Michler’s Report—Tunnel Two and One-Half Miles—Cost too Small—Barometric—Levels—Humboldt’s Opinion.

Having hastily sketched the relation of the proposed canal to the commerce of the world, its importance is sufficiently apparent to justify a careful consideration of the condition of our knowledge of the geography of the Isthmus. The facts and reasoning of previous chapters will furnish a standard, in the absence of a better, for trying the merits of the routes about to be described, and will indicate the nature of the deficiency to be supplied by future explorations.

The American Isthmus extends in length about twelve hundred miles, from the Coazacoalcos River, in Mexico, to the valley of the Atrato, in Columbia. It includes the Mexican States of Tehuantepec, the Republics of Yucatan, Guatemala, Belize, Honduras, San Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito Kingdom, and the State of Panama, one of the States of Columbia. Embracing a varied and salubrious climate; a rich soil, clothed with the luxuriance of tropical vegetation; ruins of an ancient people, consisting of vast and silent cities, whose impressive but grotesque architecture, embodying a civilization unique and insular, is overgrown with forest of flor de robles, mahogany, and palm; divided throughout its entire length by a volcanic dyke, rising to altitudes of five to six thousand feet, and sinking into depressions two hundred and eighty feet above the level of the sea; concealing in its strata the matrices of gold and precious stones; expanding in Yucatan to a width of six hundred and fifty miles, and contracting at San Blas and Darien to thirty or forty miles—this connecting link, the result of a submarine endogenous movement subsequent to the elevation of the continents which it unites, opposes a solitary but not insurmountable barrier to the commercial union of the two oceans.

The narratives of Dampier, Wafer, the adventures of the Spanish Buccaneers who infested the South Sea, and the descriptions of Las Casas, Fonseca, Don Andres de Ariza, however interesting historically, add but little to the physico-geographical knowledge of the country. These histories contain accounts of earthquakes as terrific as that which has recently visited the coast; of sieges notable for bold assault and gallant defense; of gold mines opened and abandoned; of strange fauna, birds of splendid plumage, and a tropical flora of gorgeous colors; but the reader will seek in vain for information of practical value in determining the question of a practicable route for an interoceanic ship canal.

Recent explorers have supplied much accurate information of special routes. The following table exhibits the different projects for uniting the Atlantic and Pacific:

  • 1. Tehuantepec, by the Coazacoalcos and Chicapa.
  • 2. Honduras.
  • 3. Nicaragua, from San Juan de Nicaragua and Lake Nicaragua,
  • five variations, viz.:
  • R. San Carlos, G. de Nicoya,
  • R. Nino, Tempisque, G. de Nicoya,
  • R. Sapoa, B. Salinas,
  • San Juan del Sud,
  • and Brito.
  • From San Juan de Nicaragua, by way of Lake Nicaragua and Managua,
  • three variations, viz.:
  • R. Tamarinda.
  • B. Realejo.
  • B. Fonseca.
  • 4. Panama, four distinct routes, viz.:
  • Gorgona, Panama.
  • Trinidad, Caymito.
  • Navy Bay, R. Chagres, R. Bonito, R. Bernardo.
  • San Blas, R. Chepo.
  • 5. Darien, including the old province of ChÓcÓ; the different
  • routes and the variations are five in number, viz.:
  • B. Caledonia, G. San Miguel.
  • Rs. Arguia, Paya, Tuyra, G. San Miguel.
  • B. Napipi, Cupica.
  • R. Truando, Kelley’s Island.
  • R. Tuyra, G. UrabÁ or R. Atrato.

The above lists include canal projects; the following list enumerates the projected railroads:

I. Coazacoalcos, Tehuantepec.
II. B. Honduras to G. of Fonseca.
III. R. San Juan, Nicaragua, Managua.
IV. Port Limon to Caldera, Costa Rica.
V. Chiriqui inlet to Golfo Dulce.
VI. Aspinwall, Panama, (railroad finished.)
VII. Gorgon B., Realijo } Nicaragua
VIII. Gorgon B., San Juan del Sur.

Before describing the routes above enumerated, some criteria for assisting the judgment may be brought together, as follows:

1. The Isthmean Canal may be a thorough-cut, with guard-locks.

2. It should be without a tunnel.

3. It may have a summit-level and moderate lockage, to avoid excessive tunneling and cutting.

4. Great advantages in other respects—viz.: shortness of line and fine harbors—may compensate for a short tunnel.

5. The route should possess good harbors, or such as can be easily improved.

6. Dimension of the canal and size of the locks. The canal should be sufficiently wide to permit ships to pass easily, or it should have convenient turn-outs.

The width of the intermarine canal proposed by Mr. Kennish, to unite the Atrato and the Pacific, is estimated to have 200 feet. General Michler assumes a width of 100 feet, and states that vessels can pass alternately from one end to the other, employing tug-boats and telegraphic signals to avoid confusion.

The canal now in process of construction, under the direction of General Wilson, around the Des Moines rapids on the Mississippi, has a width of 250 feet in embankment.

The Engineer in charge of the canal around the falls of the Ohio at Louisville, proposes a width of 120 feet, which is the same as that of the Caledonia Canal.

The Suez Canal has a minimum width at water surface of 190 feet. This last dimension, with a sufficient number of turn-outs, would be suitable for the canal across the American Isthmus.

The locks of the Des Moines Canal are 380 feet between gates, by 80 feet wide. General Weitzel proposes, for the Louisville Canal, locks 400 feet between gates, and 100 feet wide. The Isthmean locks may be 400 feet between gates, and 90 feet wide.

Locks of these dimensions, if all unnecessary dressing of the stone is dispensed with, may probably be erected for one million of dollars.

It is unnecessary to mention other ship canals and locks, built for the accommodation of ships of less tonnage than those which would make the intermarine transit.

The following description, commencing at Tehuantepec, will treat of each route in succession:

TEHUANTEPEC.

In March, 1842, Santa Anna, “for the purpose of aggrandizing the nation and rendering the people happy,” granted certain privileges to Don Jose de Garay, to enable him to open a line of communication between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, through the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. The route was to be neutral to all nations at peace with the Mexican Republic. The “negotiation” was permitted to hold for public use all unoccupied land, not more than one-fourth of a league on either side of the line, which was conceded to them in fee simple. The right of collecting dues was conceded for fifty years, and the exclusive privilege of freight, by steam vessel or railroad, for sixty years.

The survey was intrusted to Sr. Moro, an Italian engineer of distinction. The distance from sea to sea was ascertained to be 135 miles in a straight line. Wide plains and table land adjacent each ocean were found to be broken by the Andes, rising to the height of 650 feet above the level of the sea.

Thirty miles of the Coazacoalcos River, after passing the bar, is navigable for ships of the largest class, and fifteen miles for vessels of light draught, leaving 115 miles of railroad to be made.

Sr. Moro, taking the dimensions and cost of the Caledonia Canal as a standard, estimates the cost of a similar ship canal across the Isthmus[7] at $17,000,000. He includes in his estimate the cost of one hundred and sixty-one (161) locks, which may be reduced to one hundred and twenty. These results were not deemed satisfactory.

The privileges granted to Mr. Garay were secured by P. A. Hargous and Major (now Brevet Major-General) Barnard, Corps of Engineers. W. H. Sidell and others were employed to survey the route of a railroad. Of this survey we have the very interesting report of J. J. Williams, containing information of the statistics, geology, and topography of the country. The summit is 855 feet above tide; the entire length of the line is 190 miles. A summit-level and tunnel would be necessary to carry a canal across the ridge. Com’d Perry and Lieut. Temple, U. S. N., found about twelve feet water on the Coazacoalcos bar. The bar is supposed to be composed of hard clay, admitting of a permanent improvement. Capt. Basil Hall, R. N., and Com. Shubrick, U. S. N., speak of the Pacific terminus at Ventosa Bay as exceeding boisterous and unfavorable for anchorage.

The merits of this route have been minutely described by Col. J. J. Abert, Chief Corps Topographical Engineers, and Col. G. W. Hughes, of the same corps; and by common consent the route is regarded as possessing “little merit as a practicable line for the construction of a ship canal.”

HONDURAS.

A barometric survey was made of this route. With excellent harbors, it is obstructed by an elevated dividing ridge. The topographical features of the country indicate the probable existence of a more favorable pass. A better route may be found by starting from the Gulf of Dulce, and proceeding toward the town of Guatemala; or by starting from the same point, a more southerly direction appears to possess advantages. Inference from maps of this region must be received with caution. The route is condemned by Admiral Davis.

NICARAGUA.

With the exception of the Panama route, no Isthmean project has received so careful an examination as the lines passing through Lake Nicaragua. This part of the Isthmus widens into continental proportions of great fertility. The productive and industrial development of this country, by means of railroad or canal, would supply a material addition to the commerce of the world. With the growth of Central America, our gulf ports—Galveston, New Orleans, Mobile, Appalachicola, Pensacola, Tampa Bay, and Key West—would increase in military and commercial importance.

This line possesses additional interest for the political reasons adduced by the Emperor Napoleon III, in a memoir prepared by him when a prisoner at Ham. Arranged with method and prepared with care, this pamphlet bears the impress of a sagacious judgment. “In order,” says the writer, “that the canal should become the principal element of the advancement of Central America, it must be cut, not through the narrowest part of the tongue of land, but through the country which is most populous, the most healthy, and the most fertile, and which is crossed by the greatest number of rivers, in order that its activity may be communicated to the remotest part of the interior. England will see with pleasure Central America become a flourishing and powerful State, which will establish a balance of power by creating in Spanish America a new center of active enterprise, powerful enough to give rise to a feeling of nationality, and to prevent, by backing up Mexico, any further encroachment from the North.”

The line selected by Louis Napoleon (although he errs in his statement of distance), has not been improved by the changes in location proposed by subsequent engineers. All these routes commence at San Juan de Nicaragua, and follow the San Juan river to the Lake Nicaragua. From this lake three other routes pass through Lake Managua to Realijo, and to the Gulf of Fonseca. Lake Managua is about twenty feet above the level of Lake Nicaragua. The dry season suspends the flow of water between the lakes, and the question arises whether, even by the aid of a dam, sufficient water can be stored in the smaller lake to feed the summit level on each side of it during the dry season.

Col. Childs’ route terminates at Brito; a fifth at San Juan del Sud, and three other variations of route near the same point of the Pacific coast. Col. Childs’ report, which is very complete, was submitted to a Board of English Engineers, and to Colonels Abert and Turnbull, of the Corps of Topographical Engineers, U. S. A. Although the survey was thoroughly and scientifically executed, the route was condemned by these officers, because of the insufficiency of the harbors of Brito, and the small dimensions of the canal proposed by Colonel Childs.

The length of the canal was divided into sections, for the convenience of description and estimation of the cost:

MILES. FEET.
Western division, from Brito to the Lake 18 588
From Lake Nicaragua to head of San Juan 56 500
Slack water of seven dams on the San Juan 90 800
Canal to San Juan del Norte 28 505
Total distance 194 393

The maximum width of the canal was designed to be 118 feet, and the depth 17 feet. The descent from the lake to Brito was accomplished by fourteen locks.

The following table exhibits the distances from sea to sea of the proposed lines originating at San Juan del Norte:

ROUTES FROM THE
PORT OF SAN JUAN
TO THE PACIFIC.
LENGTH OF
THE RIO
SAN JUAN.
DISTANCE
ON LAKE
NICARAGUA.
FROM LAKE
NICARAGUA
TO THE
PACIFIC.
FROM LAKE
NICARAGUA
TO LAKE
MANAGUA.
DISTANCE
INLAKE
MANAGUA.
DIST. BETWEEN
LAKE MANAGUA
AND THE
PACIFIC.
LENGTH OF
ACTUAL
CANAL.
TOTAL
LENGTH.
MILES. MILES. MILES. MILES. MILES. MILES. MILES. MILES.
To Brito 119 57 18 137 194
Fonseca, Tamarinda 119 120 4 50 16 139 309
Realijo 119 120 4 50 45 168 338
Fonseca, Estero Real 119 120 4 50 20 143 313

The ports on the Bay of Fonseca, and at Realijo, are good, but the other ports designated as terminal points upon the Pacific are not so favorable for shipping. San Juan del Norte, the initial point upon the Atlantic of all these routes, will not admit ships of large draught, and the harbor is rapidly deteriorating. All harbors of Central and South America receiving rivers, and opening to the northward, are decreasing in depth. The incessant wave-beat, caused by the trade-winds and northers, acts like a ponderous hammer, wielded by an irresistible force, whose unceasing efforts, for six months of the year, are exerted to force the sand into the entrance of the harbors, and to arrest the sediment brought down by the rivers. The result is a tortuous and variable channel, and a shifting and shoaling bar.

The deterioration of the harbor of San Juan de Nicaragua, or Greytown, has been minutely discussed by a board of scientific officers of the United States Corps of Engineers, and of the Coast Survey Department. Their conclusions were unfavorable to the improvement of the harbor.

Where the Cyane lay during the bombardment of Greytown a luxuriant grass marsh is now growing. It has not been many years since this harbor afforded refuge for shipping of ordinary draught, but it is not unusual, at the present time, to find the harbor so completely closed during a storm that a pedestrian may walk dry-footed across the former entrance. Upon such occasion the harbor of Greytown is converted into a lagoon until after the storm, when the accumulating water of the San Juan erodes for itself a new outlet to the ocean.

It is apparent some other initial point must be found before this route can be seriously considered as a suitable terminus for interoceanic communication. Monkey Point is said to supply a good anchorage, and has been suggested for this purpose. Monkey Point affords anchorage for ships drawing rather more than three fathoms. By joining the island with a breakwater of pierre perdu, of the length of about twelve hundred feet, a good harbor, affording five fathoms water, can be obtained.

The writer is not aware that any surveys have ever been made for connecting this point with the San Juan river, or with the lakes. It is therefore unnecessary to mention other reports upon the same route, or to do more than to refer to the plans, profiles, and details of the “Interoceanic Canal of Nicaragua,” submitted at the Paris exhibition by L. J. Thome de Gamond. The report of M. de Gamond is not at hand.

A healthy and productive country; two lakes affording an inexhaustible supply for a summit level; a divide easily overcome at an altitude represented as 174 feet, and the convenient channel of the San Juan, through which the waters of Lakes Managua and Nicaragua find their way from an amphitheater of hills to the Atlantic ocean, are advantages which engineers and capitalists are loath to abandon, and which the reader relinquishes with regret. We may expect, therefore, to find the question continually revived. But its advantages have been overestimated.

The San Juan river has cut an outlet for the canal through the ridge, separating Lake Nicaragua from the Atlantic; but to pierce the divide on the opposite side, which separates the lake from the Pacific, a tunnel of about six miles in length will be requisite. The altitude of the divide is six hundred feet above the level of the lake. The singular omission in Colonel Childs’ report may have led Admiral Davis to overlook so important an objection, or perhaps he may have thought it unnecessary to multiply objections to a route which appeared impracticable upon other grounds.

CHIRIQUI.

The so-called Isthmus of Chiriqui, lying between Panama and Nicaragua, was explored by the late Lieut. St. Clair Morton, who was killed in the siege of Petersburg. Lieut. Morton crossed the Isthmus twice, and pronounced the route practicable for a railroad. As no notes of this survey are extant, curiosity in regard to this route must remain unsatisfied. Lieut. Jeffers, U. S. N., speaks favorably of the harbors. Mr. Evans, the geologist, discovered an inferior kind of coal. Another reconnoissance may develop some important information.

COSTA RICA.

A railroad has been projected from Port Limon, near the tenth parallel of latitude on the Atlantic, to Caldera, in the Gulf of Nicoya. Rising to an altitude of 5,100 feet the route passes through a salubrious climate, and over a productive soil. A macadamized road, 134 miles long, with five stone bridges, has been completed along this line. As a route for a ship canal the altitude of the summit appears to exclude it from further consideration.

PANAMA.

As the passenger route and highway of the trade between the Atlantic and Pacific States of America, the mention of this line arrests attention. Information in regard to it is full and accurate. Here, alone, in all Central America, a railroad unites the two oceans. Confining his remarks to the project of M. Garella, Admiral Davis pronounces his condemnation of the route.

M. Garella’s route, starting from the Bay of Limon, on the Atlantic, following the valley of the Chagres, ascending with 17 locks to the summit, which it passes with a tunnel 17,500 feet in length, at an altitude of 135 feet above high water in the Pacific, and descending with 18 locks, terminates at the Bay of Vaca del Monte, on the Atlantic. The altitude of the ridge to be pierced is 459 feet. The commission of the “Ponts et chaussÉs” appointed to report upon Garella’s project, object to the expense of tunneling, and to the absence of evidence of the sufficiency of the mountain streams to feed the summit level.

But a tunnel is not a necessary plan of piercing the Isthmus at this point, nor is a summit level 135 feet above high water an unavoidable necessity. The Panama railroad passes the divide without a tunnel, at an altitude of 280 feet above tide. The fact that a route possessing such advantages should be found so near the line of M. Garella, encourages the belief that a more critical examination of other prescribed routes may be rewarded with the same good fortune.

The merits above mentioned justify a more attentive consideration. The advantages of the route may be enumerated as follows:

1. A divide 280 feet above tide.

2. Distance between oceans 48 miles.

3. The Chagres river, emptying into the Atlantic, and the Rio Grande, flowing into the Pacific, together with the smaller rivers, Maraboso, Obispo, Dominica, Mandingo, which can be made tributary to the summit level of the canal. The rainfall in this region varies from 90 to 100 inches, being three times the amount which ordinarily falls in the United States.

4. The harbors at the termini, Panama and Aspinwall, have accommodated the trade of California and the Atlantic States, and are far superior to those of Port Said and Suez.

5. Tunnel unnecessary.

Possessing such advantages, the objections which have led to the ignoring of this route should be noticed.

The objection of the Commission of French Engineers to M. Garella’s project has been mentioned. “The river Chagres,” it was observed, “was gauged at Cruces and Gorgona, but the river is to be tapped above these points.”

The summit upon Garella’s line is 459 feet above tide, while upon the line of the Panama railroad it is but 280 feet. Garella proposes to pierce the ridge, at 135 feet above tide, with a tunnel three and four-tenths miles in length. No tunnel is required upon the other line.

Estimating the tunnel of M. Garella at the present contract price in the United States, this part of the work alone will cost $57,623,380.
Add 47 miles of open canal 84,232,491.
Total cost of canal $141,855,871.

A canal by the aid of locks can be constructed between the two seas, upon the line proposed by Col. Hughes, at a much less cost.

Assuming the same dimensions of canal—100 feet wide by 30 feet deep—and the same prices as above, taken from General Michler’s report upon the survey of the canal for joining the Atrato and the Pacific, and we obtain the probable cost of constructing a canal upon this line, as follows:

For 50 miles of open canal $ 89,610,150
12 locks raise the summit level 75 feet 12,000,000
Breakwater, ship basin, and contingencies 8,000,000
Total cost of canal $ 109,610,150

This diminution of cost of $32,245,721, due to the absence of a tunnel, upon this route, allows of a margin more than can be required for increasing the number of the locks, or for building, graving docks, and other auxiliary conveniences in the harbors.

The execution of this work would require a cut of less dimensions than the famous Mexican Desague of Huehuetoca, referred to by Humboldt, and described by Admiral Fitzroy as “200 feet deep and 300 feet wide for nearly a thousand yards, and above 100 feet deep through an extent of nearly a thousand yards, (making altogether two miles of distance in which the vast excavation would be capable of concealing the mast-head of a first-rate man-of-war, executed in the last three centuries in Central America,) should induce us to listen respectfully to the plans of modern engineers, however startling they may appear at first.”

Another objection remains to be considered: “Navy Bay is an insecure anchorage, and the harbor upon the Pacific is altogether insufficient for vessels of even moderate draught.” “M. Garella is obliged to include in his estimate the sum of a million and a quarter dollars for the improvement of this harbor.”

On account of the rise of the tide, which varies as much as 22 feet, vessels are compelled to anchor two and one-half miles from Panama, and the passengers and freight are transported in light-draught steamers. These difficulties may be converted, by the use of docks, as in English harbors, into an advantage. The withdrawal of 20 to 23 feet of water at extreme tides affords extraordinary facilities for constructing ship basins and docks upon the natural pavement of rock which covers the bottom of the bay in front of the City of Panama.

On the other side, Limon Bay possesses sufficient depth of water, but is open to “northers.” The entrance of these dangerous winds may be prevented by a stone breakwater, or one composed of screw piles, driven sufficiently near to support iron or flanged plates, sliding vertically into position, one above another, until the requisite height is attained, and braced strongly at the back.

Notwithstanding northers, steamships arrive and depart regularly. The Royal Mail Steamship Company are building wharves of stone and iron, and the railroad company has projected a breakwater for the protection of shipping.

Colonel G. W. Hughes, in a letter to the Hon. J. M. Clayton, at that time Secretary of State, makes the following observations in regard to this route: “The line I have traced for a railroad is, I think, more favorable for a ship canal than that suggested by M. Garella. If we adopt the same depth of cutting he suggests for an open cut, it will leave the bottom of the canal 44 feet above the level of the Pacific at high tide. This would be about ten feet lower than the bed of the river at Gorgona. An open cut two hundred feet deep would obviate all difficulty in crossing the Chagres at Gorgona, while the Rio Grande, the Obispo, and the Mandingo might be converted into an immense reservoir for supplying the summit-level with water, and the Rio Chagres above Cruces, and the Pedro, Miguel, Camero, etc., would furnish the lower level. A spacious tide basin might be constructed at the mouth of the Rio Grande, a few miles west of Panama.”

For this project, so favorably recommended, it is necessary to obtain the consent of the Panama Railroad Company to the use of land belonging to their reservation.

SAN BLAS AND BAYANO RIVER.

This route is one of several surveyed under the generous patronage of F. W. Kelly and others. The map of Mr. McDougal, the surveyor and engineer, and the report of Admiral Davis, furnish some interesting facts. The narrowest part of the Isthmus is found here, being thirty miles from ocean to ocean, and here the tide of the Pacific is said to approach within fifteen miles of the Atlantic coast.

Mr. McDougal proposes to pierce the ridge, which has an altitude of 1500 feet, at a height of 93½ feet above mean tide, by a tunnel seven miles long. The harbor of San Blas is deep and spacious. The channel leading into the Bay of Panama has not less than eighteen feet of water at mean low tide, while the rise of the water is sixteen feet. This result, Admiral Davis observes, does not agree with the admiralty charts.

The map indicates the probable existence of a better route to the north-west, and the surveyors were satisfied they saw evidences of a depression in that direction.

Admiral Davis quotes the well-merited compliment of Sir R. Murchison, to the zeal and energy with which Mr. Kelly has pursued “this great and philanthropic object,” in which “all civilized nations are deeply interested.”

DARIEN.

Between Caledonia Bay and the Gulf of San Miguel every effort to make a thorough exploration has resulted in failure. Disappointed expectations, arduous but fruitless labors, conflicting reports, failure, starvation, and death have stamped with ill omen every attempt to cross this part of the Isthmus. Baron Humboldt has directed public attention to Darien, and Admiral Davis expresses his deliberate conviction that to this part of the Isthmus we must look for a solution of the question of interoceanic ship communication.

The history of so many attempts, proving so unexpectedly disastrous, supplies much curious and valuable information. From the Paterson colonization scheme to the unfortunate expedition of Lieut. Strain, one word will characterize every attempt. The first settlement of Vasco Nunez, in 1510, after eight years of calamitous trial, was abandoned.

Paterson’s colony was remarkable in the causes which led to its inception; in the ability and statesman-like views of him who conceived a design so vast and benevolent; in the governments enlisted in its favor; in the sufferings of the colonists, and in its final abandonment.

William Paterson, a Scottish clergyman, of fertile resources, and great political sagacity, the original designer of the Bank of England, conceived the magnificent design of establishing a colony upon the shores of Darien, based on principles of religious toleration and free trade, which, occupying the highway of commerce, “grasping the riches of both the Indies, and wresting the keys of commerce from Spain,” should build up, on the shores of two oceans, cities surpassing his own Edinburgh, and rivaling ancient Alexandria. With experience drawn from long study and patient observation, he organized his scheme upon liberal commercial principles, and an enlightened political policy. Scotland, Hamburg, and Holland, contributed the sum of $4,500,000. This large amount surprised London merchants, and spread panic in the board of the East India Company. The unfriendly feeling of this great corporation proved, in the end, fatal to the scheme. Aided by Spanish intrigue, and Dutch rivalry, and bringing their vast machinery to bear against the colonists, by argument and misrepresentation, they induced William III. to issue an edict, forbidding all English colonies in the West Indies from sending provisions, arms, or ammunition to the Scottish colony of Darien.

Of 1,200 colonists, three hundred of whom represented the best blood of Scotland, thirty only returned to tell the story of their sufferings. Dissension, disease, and starvation, had accomplished the usual results. Thus, this design for the union of two great oceans failed; this effort to form a nucleus of a new system of beneficent wealth, and commerce, came to an untimely end.

The Caledonia Bay was no longer frequented by the ships of England, Holland and Scotland, The gold mines of Cana, worked by one thousand men, under the Spanish domination, were destined to remain to the present day, unmolested. The north-western slopes, and the head waters of the Chuquanaqua, reverted to the undisputed possession of the Indians, while, between the lower part of this river and along the Savana, and the Bay of San Miguel, a mongrel population of 1,200 souls cultivate bananas, and impose upon strangers.

Dr. Cullen justly claims to have recalled public attention to the merits of this route. The fine harbors of San Miguel on the Pacific, and of Caledonia Bay and Port EscocÉs on the Atlantic, taken in connection with the narrowness of the Isthmus, would attract a casual observer. The favorable opinion of Humboldt has led many to look hopefully to this region. The advantageous situation of the Savana River was pointed out by Dr. Cullen, who claims to have “crossed, and recrossed, between Caledonia Bay, and Port EscocÉs alone, during the rainy season, cutting and marking his way with a machete. From the head of the Savana,” he continues, “a ravine, three leagues in length, extends to Caledonia Bay, and there a canal might be cut with less difficulty than elsewhere, if it were not for the opposition of the natives. From the sea shore (at Caledonia) a plain extends to the base of a ridge, which runs parallel to the coast, and whose summit is 350 feet. This ridge is not quite continuous and unbroken, but is divided by transverse valleys, through which the Aglasenique and Aglatomente, and other rivers have their course, and whose highest elevations do not exceed 150 feet.”

Impressed by these favorable representations, and believing Dr. Cullen’s statement of the existence of large gold deposits near Esperitu Santu, and in the diggings of Veraguas, the distinguished capitalists, Sir Charles Fox, John Henderson, and Thomas Brassy, uniting with Dr. Cullen, obtained, by a decree of the Granadian Congress, dated BogotÁ, June 1st, 1852, the concession of the exclusive privilege of cutting a ship canal across the Isthmus of Darien, between the Gulf of San Miguel on the Pacific, and the Bay of Caledonia on the Atlantic, with the liberty of selecting any other point on the Atlantic coast between Puerto de Mosquitoes, and the west mouth of the Atrato, for the entrance of the canal; and were granted, besides the lands necessary for the canal and its works, 2,000,000 acres of land, to be selected in any part of the Republic. All the ports of Darien were declared free and neutral.

Notwithstanding these favorable conditions, it was deemed prudent, by the distinguished capitalists above mentioned, to send out a competent engineer to verify the statements of Dr. Cullen. Mr. Lionel Gisborne was selected for the purpose, and was accompanied by Dr. Cullen, to point out the way.

Before arriving in South America Mr. Gisborne, assuming the data supplied by Dr. Cullen to be correct, enters into some interesting speculations. “Let us suppose,” he observes, “the summit level to be 150 feet above the level of the sea. The Atlantic rise of tide is only 3 feet (1' 5); that of the Pacific is 25 feet (22 to 23), therefore, the difference in the level, at high and low tide is 11 feet (this, although suppositious, will, I anticipate, not be far from the truth). In such a case I would propose to cut a canal through from ocean to ocean without any locks,” etc.

Proceeding on the supposition of certain “circumstances likely to coexist in a country whose chief geological formation is igneous,” he proposed a second plan. “By embankments placed in the most advantageous position” two lakes are to be formed upon each side of the ridge, which, being cut through, ships can pass from lake to lake, and lock down to either ocean from the opposite extremities. “The only objection” to this plan, is, he thinks, “the loss of land inundated.” “I hope,” he adds, “a tract of country will be found where one or the other of these cases is applicable.” It is very remarkable that Mr. Gisborne found a country adapted to this plan.

This expedition was long delayed in Cartejena, awaiting Dr. Cullen, who was occupied with business connected with the survey before the Congress of BogotÁ. “I determined to wait for the English mails,” writes Mr. Gisborne, “due here the 25th, otherwise I should certainly not spend three weeks waiting for Dr. Cullen.” On another day, “an instrumental survey,” he prognosticates, “seems to be out of the question, so that our levels, theodolites, sextants, and chains, will probably remain in the same box Troughton and Simms consigned them to on our departure from England.”

Again, “I have read and listened about Darien Indians, their cruelty and jealousy, until I am callous and unbelieving; but it frets me to remain in doubt, ebbing out an existence in Cartejena. I have determined,” he says, “to wait ten days longer—then D. V. Cullen, or no Cullen, I shall try what can be done with these ungovernable Indians.”

Waiting impatiently, he speculates upon the Aurora Borealis, geology, magnetic observations; ingeniously proposing, by the automatic action of appropriate machinery, to make all meteorological phenomena register its name and mission in a room selected for that purpose. This he calls a “meteorological loom in which the web of time is spun with the present for a pattern.”

“May 29th—The BogotÁ mail has come, but no letter from Dr. Cullen. Every thing here is maÑana (to-morrow).”

He again takes to speculating on fortifications, and the beauty of the senoritas. A reasonable man would have been contented. But he leaves this primrose path to write, “Dr. Cullen has neither written, nor appeared in person, and I am beginning to have my doubts whether he will do so.” In the meantime Cullen was hammering at the “maÑana” Congress at BogotÁ.

After waiting six weeks he left Cartejena in disgust, and landed, without the indefatigable Doctor, in Caledonia Bay. Here he spent two days wandering among the hills with his barometer, his spirits going down as the mercury went up.

He was arrested by three half-naked Indians, who, in an unintelligible language, but plainly to be understood gestures, commanded him to follow. This he prudently acquiesced in, but not until he had, as he thought, ascertained the dividing ridge between the Atlantic and the Pacific to be 272 feet above tide. Falling asleep, with a contented mind, he thought he heard the roar of the surf of the Pacific, but his companion, Ford, very shrewdly suggested that they were still within hearing of the Atlantic. With a gentle admonition that they must never be caught there again they were permitted to return to their boat.

Naturally, he could not forbear another fling at the helpless Dr. Cullen. “I had not much faith in Dr. Cullen’s map, as his descriptions of land south-west of Port EscocÉs were directly contrary to the fact.”

The comment, on his failure may puzzle the reader. “I am far more satisfied at having failed in crossing from Port EscocÉs than to have crossed and returned (supposing that was possible with safety), and reported a summit 275 feet, when, within a few miles, one of 40 is to be got further inland.”

“It is dangerous to argue by induction,” observes Mr. Gisborne, and he gives 238 pages in illustration of this truth.

Nothing daunted by his failure to effect a transit from the Atlantic side of the Isthmus, he determines to proceed to Panama, and to make another attempt from San Miguel on the Pacific. Proceeding up the Savana river he disembarked with his Asst. Ford, who had charge of the mountain barometer, and penetrating two days’ journey into the interior, he is warned by a log over a stream that he had reached the country of his enemies, the Caledonia Indians. Remembering their parting injunction he returned. “A dreamy hope of success,” he writes, “is strengthened by inductive argument, the cause of former failures leads to generalizations of geological theories, and topographical analogy, and it was this conviction that cheered me under all difficulties, making suffering an indispensable appendage of success.”

Consoling himself with such reflections he met Dr. Cullen at Panama, in high dudgeon. The Doctor reproached him with having broken his instructions, and required that he should return to San Miguel. Gisborne was recalcitrant. “Feeling satisfied that a ship canal could be made across Darien, he urged Dr. Cullen to come to England, and, as he said he was without money, I offered to advance the passage money.”

This generous offer was accepted. Having found, as he believed, a summit of 150 feet above tide, corresponding with Dr. Cullen’s statement, he submits two plans to his employers. One for a thorough-cut without locks; the other by the junction of two lakes, for which he had found a suitable physical conformity, in remarkable harmony with his prophetic speculations before reaching Cartejena.

The first plan was estimated to cost £12,500,000, or about $62,500,000.

The friends of the measure in London were elated by the representations of the expeditionists.

The Atlantic and Pacific Junction Company was incorporated by royal charter, or act of Parliament. The capital, limited to £15,000,000, was disposed of in shares of £100 each. A deposit of ten shillings on each share was to be made without further liability, forming a sum of £75,000 for preliminary expenses.

A provisional directory was organized, with Lord Wharncliffe as chairman. Upon the publication of their prospectus, a lively correspondence sprang up between the London Times and Sir Charles Fox. The writer of the Times is charged with want of appreciation of the merits of the Darien route, and retorts, that if no one is to question Sir Charles Fox’s views, or even speak of their inaccuracies, there must be an end of discussion.

While this controversy was raging, another expedition was being organized, in numbers and appliances far exceeding any previous attempt, with the same object. England, France, and the United States coÖperated with New Granada. Not since the landing of Paterson had so formidable an expedition appeared in that region.

When the Virago entered the Bay of San Miguel, the Scorpion and l’Espeigle, with Mr. Gisborne and Dr. Cullen on board, anchored in Caledonia Bay. The French ship, La Chimere, and the American corvette, Cyane, Lieut. Strain, at the same time joined the expedition, raising the united crews to the number of 700 men.

The Granadian Government, in furtherance of the object of the expedition, had established a depot near the junction of the rivers Savana and Lara. It was confidently believed that the practicability of the Darien route was about to be set at rest forever.

Relying on Mr. Gisborne’s and Dr. Cullen’s reports, Lieut. Strain, with a party of twenty-seven men, two Granadian Commissioners, and ten days’ provisions, pushed forward up the bed of the Caledonia River. Here, taking advantage of an opening among the trees, he examined, with a spy-glass, the range of Cordillera, to find a semi-circular chain 1500 to 2000 feet in height. He concluded that this route could not be that alluded to by Mr. Gisborne and Dr. Cullen. He still pushed forward up arduous ascents. A seaman of the Cyane climbed a tree to reconnoiter the country, and reported nothing but hills and mountains in every direction. For a pathetic account of this unfortunate expedition, the reader is referred to Harper’s Monthly, Vol. X.

After forty days of wandering, subsisting for the time chiefly on sour palmetto berries, emaciated with hunger, lacerated with thorns, sick, and half naked, Strain, having hastened ahead of his party, sought succor in Yvisa. Proceeding to the Savana, he presented himself to the English agent, who, receiving him with every kindness, shed tears at the sight. Securing assistance, which was reluctantly granted, at Yvisa, he hastily returned to find the remnant of his party, feebly struggling back toward Caledonia Bay, having lost five of their number, among whom were the two Granadian Commissioners.

Strain, mistaking the Chuquanaqua for the Savana, reached the Pacific by the longest route. He claims that his expedition “has disproved a magnificent preconceived theory,” and that instead of a summit-level of 150 feet, it is at least 1000 feet.

Three days after the departure of Strain, “another party, composed of English and French together, under the guidance of Dr. Cullen and Mr. Gisborne, set out from the same point, and endeavored to follow in his track.” “Gisborne and Cullen could not follow their own maps,” and after having “penetrated not more than six miles in all, returned.” Mr. Gisborne, observes the narrator in the Nouvelles Annales des Voyages, “dementait complÉtement” his former statements. They failed to confirm the first statements, and the London company, organized with such high hopes, was dissolved.

On the heels of Gisborne and Cullen, the Granadian expedition, under the command of Codazzi, made a cotemporaneous essay. “How far,” says Strain, “it penetrated is not known; but, struggling over the space of a mile, it was broken up, and returned after having lost several men.”

While failure and misfortune was befalling the exploring parties starting from the Atlantic coast, another attempt was made at the same time to effect a transit from the now notable Savana. Capt. Prevost, of the Virago, after advancing twenty-six miles, at the rate of one and one-half miles per day, returned again to the Savana, followed, says Mr. Gisborne, by two hundred hostile Indians. Four sailors, left to guard a depot of provisions, were found murdered.

Capt. Prevost failed to find a practicable pass. Crossing valleys which probably led to the Pacific, the altitude of which is not given, he terminated his survey at a summit of 1080 feet above the level of the ocean. “L’execution de canal interoceaneque Était devenue Á peu pris impracticable,” remarks the reviewer.

After an examination of the maps of Gisborne, Prevost, Strain, and Codazzi, there seems to be a general agreement in placing the summit of the ridge at not less than one thousand feet above the level of the tide. The united maps of Prevost and Gisborne exhibit their routes, proceeding from opposite points and intersecting, and the continuous profile between the two oceans fails to solve the question of a practicable route. As one of these parties had the advantage of Dr. Cullen’s personal guidance, it is but fair to allow him to supplement his first statement by an explanation of the causes which led to a failure so complete and unexpected.

Speaking of the party from the Virago, he observes that Capt. Prevost “directed his explorations too far to the north-west.” That when it stopped he was but thirty miles from the point where the line should pass.

Strain, on the other hand, erred by going “too far to the south-west.” In a word, the true line is to be found in the golden mean in which Aristotle places all virtue.

But he has so far modified his first statement that he now thinks a line, “with tunneling,” may be found between Sucubti and Port EscocÉs. Under nine heads, he enumerates the advantages of this route.

The reader has, perhaps, concluded that, like Pantagruel’s army, this subject is pretty well covered with tongue, and he may even adopt the conclusion of a distinguished attorney-general upon the fallibility of this unruly member. But one or two of the nine may be quoted. Under No. 7 Dr. Cullen states the land rises to nine hundred and thirty feet, and that here a tunnel will be required. No. 8 states that between this point and the Pacific no obstacle is to be found. The divide of one hundred and fifty feet, first discovered by Dr. Cullen, expanded to ten times that altitude.

If men of intelligence and education can so err, all statements of persons whose previous habits and studies have not fitted them for passing judgment upon the relative merits of different canal routes should be received with caution.

The failure of this formidable effort of four Governments to discover a practicable route for a ship canal between Caledonia Bay and the Gulf of San Miguel, while it disappointed reasonable expectation, stimulated public curiosity. The French, in nowise discouraged, determined to make another effort. The Granadian Minister, Francisco Martin, and Senator F. Barrow, signed, at Paris, a treaty embodying certain concession.

According to agreement, the survey was to be conducted from the head of the Chuquanaqua toward the village of Monti, where Codazzi represented a summit of 460 feet.

M. Bourdiol, Civil Engineer, with a party of fifteen persons—afterward increased to twenty by the addition of some natives—proceeded carefully, cutting their way, and chaining and leveling at the rate of about a mile a day. Reaching the Chuquanaqua below the junction of the Sucubti, he was compelled to desist, by the approach of the rainy season. He returned to Panama after an absence of sixty days.

The nearest approach to a determination of a pass by M. Bourdiol appears in the rather equivocal statement, that the origin of the valley of Monti is one hundred and eighty-two metres (about 597 feet).

If all of these explorers had left some permanent mark at the termination of their surveys, succeeding parties could have taken up the line where the former left off, and the determination of a practicable route could have been made in one-half the time now required.

M. Bourdiol affirms that he verified the height of the Sucubti, as given by Codazzi and Gisborne, but it is not apparent how he found the same points determined by these engineers.

Where so many failed, with every accessory and advantage likely to assure success, the pertinent inquiry suggests itself, Is there any one fact in common which may serve to explain failures so universal? All find difficulties in cutting the way, requiring natives accustomed to the use of the machete; all are misled by imperfect maps, which fail to give the altitude of the passes and the true course of the rivers. While one party is turned back by the rainy season, another is stopped by the Indians, another by want of time. But one party succeeded in crossing from sea to sea, but under such circumstances that each day was a struggle for existence, to the exclusion of the scientific objects of the expedition.

The hostility of the Indians, although not always stated, appears to have been the chief obstacle to a careful exploration; and internal dissension concurred to bring failure upon the best appointed of these expeditions.

The following table presents, at one view, all that is known of the Darien routes:

NAMES. LOCALITY. SUMMIT
REPORTED
REMARKS.
FEET.
Cullen Savana, Port EscocÉs 150? “Crossed and recrossed?”
Gisborne 150? Saw across to former position?
Cullen { Started at 980! { Second attempt and
Gisborne Caledonia Bay. failed to cross over.
Strain Caledonia Bay. 1000+ Lost his way on the Chuquanaqua.
Prevost Savana River. 1080 Did not see the Pacific.
Bourdiol 597? Turned back by rain.

It would appear, at the first glance, that the question of a practicable route across the Isthmus of Darien was settled by these explorers.[8] Dr. Cullen, notwithstanding the unfortunate result of his early prognostications, still remains sanguine, and opines that the valleys of the Aglatomente and Aglasenaca afford levels favorable to a canal; but Gisborne’s map represents the water-shed of the Aglasenaca at 1,020 feet above the level of the sea, and supplies no indications of a lower summit. But Capt. Prevost gives some important testimony. In a letter to Admiral Moresby, written after the return of his expedition, he speaks of valleys at a lower level than any yet discovered, leading to the Pacific. His map confirms this statement. Capt. Parsons, R. N., of the Scorpion, testifies to the same effect. From the deck of his vessel he could discern a very decided break in the ridge, which appeared continuous when viewed from other points.

These estimates we have learned to receive with caution. “A dreamy hope of success is strengthened by inductive argument,” observes Mr. Gisborne, “the cause of former failures leads to generalizations,” etc., and such faint lights have so far proved veritable will-o’-the-wisps. In the present instance, concurrent opinion is highly favorable. The appearance of isolated summits, and disjointed and dislocated character of schistose and trychitic rock; the testimony of Prevost and Parsons, to the appearance of a break in the ridge; the fact that Col. Hughes found at Panama a summit of two hundred and eighty feet above the sea, at two miles north of the line, upon which Garella could not find less than four hundred and fifty-nine feet above the same level; all these facts, if not “confirmations strong as proofs of Holy Writ,” are more than “trifles light as air,” and go far to confirm the opinion that the Isthmus of Darien has not been sufficiently explored.

SAN MIGUEL TO THE GULF OF URABÀ.

Sr. Gorgoza, a Granadian, represents that he has passed over this line, and found an altitude of one hundred and ninety feet. How this elevation was determined without a barometer or spirit-level is not clear. This part of the Isthmus is referred to in general terms by Humboldt, Fitzroy, and Trautwine, but as these authorities echo each other, the inference derives little additional strength from their concurrence.

ATRATO.

Taking leave of the Darien surveys, the explorations in the province of ChÓcÓ come next in order. Under this head are included the surveys made in the valley of the Atrato. Success appears to have accompanied these operations, as disaster followed the Darien expeditions. The hopes centering in any one Isthmean route have been in the inverse ratio of the information concerning them.

The indispensable desiderata of a summit of moderate elevation, and deep harbors, have not yet been found existing conjointly together. The volcanic agency which hollowed out deep basins where ships may securely anchor, has, at the same time, given unusual altitude to the dividing ridge. Shallow harbors and low divides, and deep harbors and great altitudes, accompany each other with the persistence of a law.

As the explorations dissipated the hope of one route, another was taken up. Vague rumors continually reach us similar to those we have already encountered. One of the latest of these is this: A Mr. or Sr. Gorgoza, a resident of New Granada, has found a short and easy transit across the Cordillera, between the Gulf of San Miguel and UrabÀ (or Darien), by ascending the Tuyra, and crossing the valley of the Atrato. According to his statement, the depression in the divide is not more than 190 feet above the mean tide, and the distance between head waters, navigable by canoes, is not more than three miles.

DE LA CHARME ROUTE—BY THE WAY OF TUYRA,
PAYA, AND CAQUARRI TO THE ATRATA.

The March number of Putnam’s Monthly contains a description of a route surveyed by M. De La Charme, which occupies a position between the Darien routes, and the line between Humboldt Bay and the Atrato, surveyed by Lieut. Michler.

The article referred to gives an account of what appears to be the latest reconnoissance made in that region, and claims for its author, M. De La Charme, “the right of discovery.” Of this survey Sr. De Gorgoza is the patron and prime mover.

The attention of Sr. De Gorgoza was called to this route by certain “documents” containing “hints about passages used by the Indians in crossing the Cordilleras.” These documents consisted of “reports by the civil and ecclesiastical authorities about the province of Balboa, which was, at that time, of great importance, from its rich gold mines,” and are probably as reliable as any other civil and ecclesiastical reports of the pious marauders of that period. These reports were accompanied by “a map,” which seems, from a reference upon page 133, to have been that remarkable specimen of puzzling topography, known as Arisa’s map, a copy of which may be found appended to the report of Admiral Davis. The usual reference is made to those unconscious pioneers of interoceanic canal routes, the filibusters, “who carried off quantities of gold, to the great detriment of the Spanish treasury,” etc., etc.

This reliable evidence is further corroborated by the flight of birds. Some Pissisi ducks providentially appear to lead our explorer upon the right path, and M. De La Charme is so convinced that the route will be found in the direction taken by these web-footed engineers, that he confidently affirms “there remained to me no doubt but at this place I should find the desired passage. So persuaded,” he “prosecuted his work with confidence.”

Many immaterial facts are circumstantially related, but we are not told by what method the survey was conducted, nor whether M. De La Charme was assisted in his work by professional engineers. Without such assistance, his duties must have been complicated and laborious. As mention is made of bogas and laborers only, we must conclude that this arduous duty was performed without any intelligent assistance.

He states that strict attention was given to barometric measurements. The notes should have been supplied in proof of the accuracy of his conclusions.

The irregularities of the barometer along the dividing ridge of the Isthmus and in South America have been noticed by Moro, Hughes, Herndon, Maury, Michler, and other observers. Used with extreme care, and according to the method recommended by Lieut. Col. Williamson, U. S. A., the results obtained with this instrument are affected by discrepancies and anomalies, which, along the Andes, vitiate the most careful observations, and elude the grasp of the best formulÆ.

A favorable reconnoissance with the barometer, in this region, should receive a careful verification with more accurate instruments, but it can not be regarded as establishing the feasibility of a route.

The map of M. De La Charme, like that of Dr. Cullen, is made up from old maps. The additional topographical information is not laid down.

Two parties were sent to the Isthmus to verify this route. One, composed of French engineers, was under the charge of M. Flacat; the other, composed of American engineers, was under the direction of Mr. Spooner. With both the principals Sr. De Gorgoza quarreled, and the parties returned without accomplishing the work for which they had made so long a journey.

The following paragraphs contain all that M. De La Charme claims to have established. If correct, he is justly entitled to the right of discovery, in the furtherance of which claim “he considers it his duty to publish the present memorandum.”

“This canal should go in a straight course E. 20° S. from Real Viejo to the village of Paya, thence south-east through the passage between the Cordilleras and the Andes, and, finally, easterly or north-easterly, as should prove best for the navigation from the Atlantic by the Atrato. It would not be more than fifty miles long, and would traverse a country whose formation presents no difficulties to the opening of the same, either in the excavation or in the removal of the materials excavated, an important point in works of this kind.

“The highest point or summit-level of the route thus explored was near the village of Paya. It was, by barometrical measurement, one hundred and seventy-eight feet (about 55 metres) above the level of the sea, and this must necessarily be very nearly the true altitude. And, it may be added, the field notes of the expedition contain satisfactory data respecting the questions of practical engineering involved, such as feeders, locks,” etc.

So little accurate information exists in regard to the topography of the Isthmus, there is always a probability in favor of the discovery of new routes. But the uncertainty which must attach to the sanguine representations based upon interested but unprofessional examinations, has been made sufficiently apparent. Such statements can not be accepted without verification. This is doubtless all that Sr. Gorgoza desires.

ROUTES OF PORTER, KENNISH, AND TRAUTWINE.

In July, 1857, the results of a survey from the Atrato to the Pacific, made by Mr. Kennish, under the direction of F. W. Kelley, were laid before the Secretaries of War and Navy. Mr. Trautwine had previously surveyed the Atrato from its mouth to its head, crossing the ridge in three places, obtaining much valuable information. Mr. Porter made a survey in 1853. The survey of Mr. Kennish, before alluded to, was made in 1855.

Commencing at the mouth of the Atrato River, the work to be done is described as follows: The mouth of the Atrato being obstructed by bars, the caÑo coquito, by which the river is to be united with the Gulf of UrabÀ, having at the present time a depth of four feet water, is to be excavated to a depth of thirty feet. From thence sixty-five miles to the mouth of the Truando, the depth is not less than forty-seven feet. The bar at the mouth of the Truando is eighteen feet. For six miles the river has an average depth of fourteen feet. From thence to the Pacific, twenty-six miles, much of the distance is through solid rock. At 505 feet above the ocean level, Mr. Kennish proposes to pierce the divide by a tunnel three and one-half miles in length, sufficiently large to admit two ships abreast.

The harbor at the Pacific terminus requires improvement; guard locks not considered necessary. Total length of the line, one hundred and twenty-six miles. The results of this survey were regarded as highly favorable by the friends of the measure.

Mr. Kelley regarded his labors and expenditures as well rewarded. “Franklin,” he observes, “was not more delighted when he drew lightning from the clouds, nor Columbus when he discovered America, than I was when it was demonstrated, by instrumental measurement, that the two oceans could be united, that all the science, industry, enlightened enterprise, and generous expenditure had not been exhausted in vain.”

To verify this survey, Congress authorized the Secretaries of War and Navy to organize a joint expedition. In accordance with this authority, the Secretary of the Navy designated Com. Craven. This gallant officer was afterward sunk off Mobile, and lost with all the crew of his ship.

To Lieut. N. Michler, Corps of Topographical Engineers, (now Brevet Brigadier-General,) the execution of the topographical survey was assigned. The operations of this officer were published in the form of a diary, with special scientific reports and observations, accompanied by maps and profiles. The special reports embrace observations upon geology, botany, hipsometrical and astronomical determinations, climatology, and field notes.

The itinerary is full and interesting, supplying information valuable to future explorers. The reader is never asked to accept a statement upon the ipse dixit of the writer. The observation of a corps of intelligent surveyors is laid before the reader.

The line adopted by General Michler may be described as follows: To avoid the bar at the mouth of the Atrato, a canal, about two and one-half miles, is to be cut through the channel of the caÑo coquito. The mouth of this caÑo is protected by nature from the prevailing winds. The Atrato affords navigation for the largest ships. The remaining part of the line is described in General Michler’s words: “Let the first section follow the projected line referred to above, across the Lagunas to its intersection with the Truando; the second section connects this last point by a straight line with the head of the Palizadas; the third extends in a direct line to the foot of the Saltos; the fourth in a curved line to the head of the Saltos, including a tunnel of 800 feet through the Sierra de los Saltos; the fifth leads directly to the mouth of the river GrundÓ, a tributary of the Nercua; the sixth leaves the valley of the Nercua at the point by a straight line, perpendicular to the axis of the Cordilleras de los Andes, and, after piercing the mountains with a tunnel 12,500 feet in length, continues on to the mouth of the Chuparador; the seventh follows for some distance down the valley of the river ParacuchichÍ; and, lastly, the eighth strikes in a direct line for the Bahia EnsenadÁ, or Estero de ParacuchichÍ.

“The line proposed by Mr. Kennish differs very materially from the one just described. It leaves the Atrato at the mouth of the Truando, and follows the meanderings of the stream to its junction with the Nercua; it then ascends the valleys of the latter and of the Hingador, and strikes across the mountains to the Pacific. The length of the cut by his plan is stated in his report to be 56.08 miles.

“In order to complete the line of canal communication between the Atrato and the Pacific, it is necessary to connect the Estero de ParacuchichÍ with Humboldt’s Bay. It is proposed to do this by a cut from the former across the peninsula, and then by building out in its prolongation, from the shores of the latter, jetties to form a passage through the surf into deep water of the ocean. The depth of the cut between them will have to be sufficient to allow for the swells of the latter, at least from thirty-five to forty feet below low tide.”

To connect the Atrato with the Pacific by a canal without locks, there would be 95 miles of river navigation, and 52? miles of canal, making an aggregate length of 147? miles.

The following table gives the different items and the total cost of the work:

Interoceanic Ship Canal.

Summary of the estimated cost of the canal and appurtenances.
OBJECT OF EXPENDITURE. ESTIMATE BY
GEN. MICHLER
FOR EXCAVATION
AND TUNNELING.
Works at the mouth of the Atrato $500,000
Excavation of earth 24,835,173
Rock cuttings 64,774,950
Tunneling 13,995,000
Pacific harbor improvements 1,150,000
Light-house 35,000
Piers 25,000
Depots on Pacific 50,000
Depots on line, and hospital 35,000
Depot at junction 15,000
Executive department 120,000
Engineer department 375,000
Medical department 80,000
Pay department 90,000
Commissary department 120,000
Quartermaster’s department 135,000
Dredging machinery 350,000
Hoisting and pumping engines’ machinery 875,000
$ 107,560,123
Add 25 per cent. for contingencies 26,890,031
$ 134,450,154

This estimate supposes the dimensions of the canal to be 100 feet wide and 30 feet deep. This rate ($2.50) per cubic yard is evidently too small. Estimating this tunnel at the contract price being employed ($5.40), the cost will be $30,229,200; and should the price reach the not improbable limit of $10 per cubic yard, the cost will be increased to $55,970,000. Substituting these sums in place of the cost of tunneling as given in the above estimate, and the total cost of the canal along this route will, in the first case, be $150,684,354, and, in the second case, $176,625,154, which is not excessive, if the tunnel is to be lined throughout.

The Penaebach tunnel is the only one in England that is self-supporting. It is driven through solid basalt. The Penmaenwhr tunnel, pierced through hard green-stone, had to be lined throughout; and the Bangor tunnel, supposed to be sufficiently firm, was afterward cased with brick. It has been found necessary to line some of the tunnels of the Washington aqueduct, which are driven through very hard gneiss.

Before taking leave of this instructive report, we have selected some interesting portions of the narrative and scientific statements for quotation:

“The great falls of the Hingador are grand and exceedingly romantic, and equal in height and beauty to many of those in other countries which elicit so much admiration from all lovers of magnificent scenery. The valley itself is pleasant to gaze upon; many bright streams gush into it, and impart additional charms to the already picturesque landscape of falls and rapids, and rich tropical vegetation. Several thermal springs were discovered at the foot of the great falls.

“As the party had to wade through the water, over smooth and slippery rocks, and clamber up steep precipices, it took four days to accomplish this section of the survey. Several fragments of rocks were broken off at the head of the falls for subsequent analysis. According to the report of the geologist, of which the following is an extract, ‘the rocky falls were found to be overcoated with a light, shaly conglomerate of a cemented texture, and containing, imbedded in a calcareous matrix, coarse sand and gravel. Higher up, in one of the western head branches of this stream, a more consolidated semi-rock was noticed, containing copiously interspersed fragments of little shells. This rock seems also to be impregnated with carbonate of lime.’”

The character of the natives may be gathered from the extract: “January 30th, 1858—Whilst seated on the rocks overlooking the falls, and listening to the music of the roaring waters, as they rushed fiercely past, with an occasional anxious glance at the curve of the river above, in expectancy of the momentary appearance of the long-expected canoe, the attention was suddenly drawn toward a long line of Indians, men, women, and children, emerging from the trail over the Sierra. As they filed by, several familiar faces were seen, and a kindly nod of recognition given and returned. Each bore a pack, from the largest to the smallest; these rested upon the back, and were supported by bands, composed of the bark of trees, which passed in front of the forehead. Most of their effects were packed away in baskets, made of bark of certain trees, and very neatly manufactured. They proved to be old friends from Tocame, and were en route to make a visit to one of their Tambos, on the Nercua. All fear as to moving ahead was dispelled at sight of them. After depositing their loads on the rocks, near the small haven, just above the falls, they all left again as quietly as they had come, in order to bring up their canoes over the Saltos.

“Whilst the members of the engineer corps were extremely anxious to discharge their duties accurately and faithfully, and to prosecute, in the most thorough manner, every conceivable examination which could, in the remotest degree, furnish additional information in reference to the great work upon which they were engaged; still, circumstances over which they had no control, such as their want of provisions, and the scarcity of money wherewith to purchase and renew even necessary supplies, compelled them to turn back from the Pacific, and leave unaccomplished the reconnoissance of both the ParacuchichÍ and Jurador rivers. To have rendered their labors complete these examinations should have been made in connection with their other most interesting duties. The future survey of these streams, and more especially of the former, together with that of the country, between its head-waters and those of the Pavarador, a tributary of the Nercua, and also between some of the tributaries of the Truando and the coast, at some more southern point of Humboldt Bay, may throw a flood of light upon the feasibility of the work in contemplation.”

He again expresses his regret that he was unable to extend his examination:

“It is to be greatly regretted that circumstances prevented the party from gaining more minute information concerning the valley of the ParacuchichÍ, and of the transversal passes leading from it through the mountains into the valley of a large tributary of the Truando, which flows in only a few miles above its mouth. As this river has more than twice the quantity of water possessed by the Nercua, it is highly probable that a still more favorable route can be found leading out from its valley above the junction.”

The following table of comparison between altitudes, determined by the level and by barometric observations, shows how much has been gained in accuracy, since the time of Humboldt, in the use of the barometer:

Table of data used in computing the various heights, with the results as compared with the heights obtained by the level.
STATIONS. MEAN
READING OF
BAROMETER.
MEAN
TEMP.
BAROMETRIC
HEIGHT.
HEIGHT
BY
LEVEL.
DIFFERENCE.
INCHES. DEG. FEET. FEET. FEET.
Sea coast 29.874 80. ... ... ...
First camp on Truando 29.817 75.4 58.39 44.57 + 13.82
Tocame 29.805 76.8 69.6 57.39 12.21
Foot of Saltos 29.759 76.1 122.65 97.5 25.15
Observatory Hill 29.663 76.6 207.45 204.95 2.5
Head Salto Grande 29.741 75.9 132.3 138.79 - 6.49
Head of Saltos 29.737 75.9 138.1 183.47 45.37
Junction of Rivers Nercua and Truando 29.674 77. 192.5 192.6 + 0.44
Tambo 29.607 77. 260.92 264.4 - 3.48
First Ridge west of Rio Nercua 28.815 75.2 1,046.45 ... ...
[9] Log Crossing on { No. 1362 29.053 75.2 809.42 791.23 + 18.19
Rio Hingador ... ... Mean 879.9 ... ...
No. 1363 28.912 75.2 949.94 ... ...
Camp on Hingador 29.074 75.2 788.6 814.32 - 25.72
Dividing Ridge 28.913 75.2 948.5 947.44 + 1.06
Rio Chupepe 29.631 75.2 240.24 241.35 - 1.11
Rio Totumia, below Dos Bocas 29.837 75.2 40.6 45.3 5.24

These hypsometric determinations differ from the true levels at the points of observation from two to forty-five feet. These figures fall considerably within the limit of error considered as probable by Baron Humboldt. This distinguished observer states that the barometer may be trusted to determine heights to within from seventy-five or ninety feet of the truth.


                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           

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